Publications

Publications

Publications

2025
  • Ratto, M., Vicary, S. (2025). “Do the poor benefit from a well defined tax regime?”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 27, no 4, p. e70040.
  • Ispano, A. (2025). The perils of a coherent narrative. Economic Theory, 1-15.
  • Sémirat, S., & Forges, F. (2025). Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games. Accepted in Mathematics of Operations Research.
2024
  • Biancini, S., Ettinger, D., & Venet, B. (2024). When pro-poor microcredit institutions favour richer borrowers: A moral hazard story. Canadian Journal of Economics, 57(1), 225-242.
  • Forges, F., & Ray, I. (2024). Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: Back to the roots. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103044.
  • Forges, F., Koessler, F., & Salamanca, A. (2024). Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103023.
  • Ispano, A., & Vida, P. (2024). Designing interrogations. Review of Economic Studies, 91(6), 3504-3531.
  • Rimbaud, C., & Soldà, A. (2024). Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition. Experimental Economics, 27, 491–547.
2023
  • Attanasi, G., Rimbaud, C., & Villeval, M. C. (2023). Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 690-717.
  • Forges, F. (2023). Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information. Revue économique, 74(4), 529-539.
  • Ispano, A., & Schwardmann, P. (2023). Cursed consumers and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 71(2), 407-440.
  • Mathis, J. (2022). Combien vaut une vie pour l'État ?, in L'Économie Décryptée, Clichy: Éditions Marie B, p. 69-76.
2022
  • Acconcia, A., D’Amato, M., Martina, R., & Ratto, M. (2022). The response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unification. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 73, p. 102-158.
  • Forges, F., & Sákovics, J. (2022). Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm. International Journal of Game Theory, 51(3-4), 589-605.
  • Sémirat, S., & Forges, F. (2022). Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 242-263.
2021
  • Deversi, M., Ispano, A., & Schwardmann, P. (2021). Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure. European Economic Review, 139, 103872.
  • Dominiak, A., & Lefort, J. P. (2021). Ambiguity and probabilistic information. Management Science, 67(7), 4310-4326.
  • Gordon, S., Marlats, C., & Ménager, L. (2021). Observation delays in teams and effort cycles. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 276-298.
  • Gordon, S., Henry, E., & Murto, P. (2021). Waiting for my neighbors. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(2), 251-282.
  • Ettinger, D., & Jehiel, P. (2021). An experiment on deception, reputation and trust. Experimental Economics, 24, 821-853.
  • Forges, F., & Renault, J. (2021). Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval. International Journal of Game Theory, 50, 475-502.
  • Lécuyer, E., & Lefort, J. P. (2021). Put–call parity and generalized neo-additive pricing rules. Theory and Decision, 90(3), 521-542.